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The concept of tenure is firmly and deeply established in
the academic world. A 1972 tally reported that 94 percent of all
college and university faculty worked at institutions with a ten-
ure system.' In 1985, about 70-75 percent of full-time faculty
reported ties to a tenure system.2 In 1993, tenure reportedly
operated on over 90 percent of college campuses.3
Despite its prevalence, tenure continues to be subject to
considerable scrutiny and criticism.4 Many faculty in tenure-
granting institutions register dissatisfaction with their tenure
and promotion systems5 (although it is reasonable to presume
that most faculty would argue against the elimination of ten-
ure). More to the point, tenure continues to elicit serious criti-
cism from outside of academia. 6 A recent example comes from
the New York Times, which stated that "tenure promotes ineffi-
ciency, inhibits competition and probably raises costs to con-
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Dec. 12, 1993, at E4.
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sumers"7 and that tenure "is no longer necessary to protect
professors' freedom to speak out politically."8
Much of the contemporary criticism of tenure centers on the
following arguments: 1) tenure is no longer necessary to protect
academic freedom, and 2) tenure protects or even rewards medi-
ocrity and incompetence to the extent that it releases faculty
from conventional methods of accountability. 9 The first of these
two criticisms questions the longstanding link between tenure
and academic freedom.
The significance of this link extends back to the establish-
ment of tenure at American universities. In 1894, the Board of
Regents of the University of Wisconsin approved a statement of
principles that has sometimes been labeled the Magna Carta of
academic freedom.10 The statement was prompted by pressures
to fire a faculty member because of his controversial writings on
the trade union movement. The statement said, in part, that
"[i]n all lines of academic investigation it is of the utmost impor-
tance that the investigator should be absolutely free to follow
the indications of truth wherever they may lead.""
This statement was followed a few years later by the classic
report on academic freedom and tenure, formulated by a com-
mittee of the American Association of University Professors
(AAUP) in 1915.12 The report held as essential that faculty "be
exempt from any pecuniary motive or inducement to hold, or to
express, any conclusion which is not the genuine and uncolored
product of his own study or that of fellow-specialists."13 To this
end, the report argued for "the reasonable security of tenure,"
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Stanley Feingold, Leonard Jeffries and Academic Freedom, CONG.
MONTHLY, July-Aug. 1993, at 10, 11.
10. WALTER P. METZGER ET AL., DIMENSIONS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM 69 (1969).
11. Id. at 70.
12. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 468-74 (1965). The AAUP was formed
in 1915 in large measure to protect the principle of academic freedom and stand-
ardize the tenure process on university campuses. Yet it was also spurred by the
desire to professionalize the professoriate and provide a counterbalance to the
power of campus administrators. The AAUP's formation was aided by the reform-
ist zeal that was sweeping the country during the Progressive era. Id. at 468-80.
13. General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Ten-




with an added provision for dismissal based on just cause, and
the opportunity for a hearing prior to any contemplated
dismissal. 14
These sentiments were amplified in a 1940 AAUP state-
ment, arguing for tenure as a means to insure intellectual free-
dom for teaching, research, and service activities, as well as to
provide some measure of economic security in order to attract
and retain qualified individuals in the profession. 15 In short,
tenure and academic freedom are "inextricably intertwined"16
because the former awards economic security in order to "fore-
stall restrictions on freedom that might stem from the power to
dismiss." 17 The use of such power could stem from pressures
inside or outside of the university.
The second criticism of tenure, that it rewards and protects
mediocrity, has surfaced increasingly in recent decades, since
most have argued that faculty no longer face serious threats to
academic freedom. In the aftermath of campus tensions and
unrest in the 1960s, two national commissions reexamined the
issue.18 One commission, headed by negotiator Sol Linowitz, 19
said that tenure "sometimes has been a shield for indifference
and neglect of scholarly duties."20 Another commission, headed
by former Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton, said that
tenure may "grant faculty members a freedom from accounta-
bility that would be unacceptable for any other profession."
21
These longstanding concerns have found sharp focus in re-
cent years as a result of the highly publicized incidents of City
14. Id. at 405-06.
15. 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, reprinted
in 53 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 407, 407-09 (Summer 1990).
16. PAUL H. MORRILL & EMIL R. SPEES, THE ACADEMIC PROFESSION 225 (1982).
17. Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Function, and
History, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM: THE SCHOLAR'S PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY 1
(Hans W. Baade ed., 1964). This article can also be found in THE AMERICAN CON-
CEPT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN FORMATION (Walter P. Metzger ed., 1977).
18. SPECIAL COMM. ON CAMPUS TENSIONS, CAMPUS TENSIONS: ANALYSIS & REC-
OMMENDATIONS 5-7 (1970); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON CAMPUS UN-
REST 1-6 (1970).
19. Sol Linowitz is a lawyer and diplomat who served as a special negotiator
for President Jimmy Carter. In particular, he helped negotiate the Panama Canal
Treaties in 1977-1978, and served as a special Middle East negotiator from 1979-
1981. WHo'S WHO IN AMERICA 2038 (41st ed. 1981).
20. SPECIAL COMM. ON CAMPUS TENSIONS, supra note 18, at 42-43.




College, City University of New York (CUNY) professors
Michael Levin and Leonard Jeffries, Jr.22 In both cases, ten-
ured faculty members have come under fierce criticism for their
espousal of not only controversial, but inflammatory views. 23
Moreover, these views are at best thinly supported by estab-
lished scholarship, and have been aired outside of the univer-
sity setting.24 Predictably, many have called for the discipline,
resignation, or termination of each.25 Just as predictably, some
have countered that Levin and Jeffries are variously protected
by tenure, academic freedom, and the First Amendment. 26
This article does not propose to rehash the arguments in
favor of and against tenure. 27 That debate, along with careful
histories of the development of tenure and academic freedom,
are available elsewhere. 28 The author does note, however, these
features of tenure: it is by no means a practice unique to the
teaching profession, even though the label "tenure" is rarely ap-
plied to other systems of employment;29 whatever its virtues,
tenure provides no absolute guarantee of academic freedom or
intellectual autonomy, either from inside or outside of the uni-
22. Levin v. Harleston, 770 F. Supp. 895 (1991), aff'd in part, 966 F.2d 85 (2d
Cir. 1992); Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd in part,
21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. granted and judgment vacated by 115 S. Ct. 502
(1994).
23. See, e.g., Jerry Gray, Educators Chided for Race Remarks, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1991, at 34.
24. See, e.g., Samuel Weiss, Are There Any Enforceable Limits on Academic
Freedom of Speech?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, § 4 at 8.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 42-46.
26. A Professor Flaunts His Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1991, at A26; Alessan-
dra Stanley, City College Professor Assailed for Remarks on Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 1991, at B4; Sam H. Verhovek, Cuomo Urges CUNY to Act on Professor, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 8, 1991, at B1, B4; Weiss, supra note 24, at 8.
27. See Commission on Academic Tenure in Higher Educ., supra note 1, at 13-
20 (summarizing the arguments for and against tenure); BARDWELL L. SMITH ET
AL., THE TENURE DEBATE (1973); MORRILL & SPEES, supra note 16, at 230-31.
28. See, e.g., CLARK BYSE & Louis JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER ED.
UCATION: PLANS, PRACTICES, AND THE LAW (1959); RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER
P. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES
(1955); WALTER P. METZGER ET AL., TENURE (1979).
29. See BYSE & JOUGHIN, supra note 28, at vii-viii; Matthew W. Finkin, "A
Higher Order of Liberty in the Workplace": Academic Freedom and Tenure in the





versity setting;30 it incorporates responsibilities and obligations
as well as freedom; 31 and in all probability tenure is here to stay
because of its prevalence, its resilience to attack, its sanctioning
in law, and support from unions.32
This article will first examine the Jeffries episode to deter-
mine whether it indeed supports the above-mentioned criti-
cisms of tenure-specifically, that it protects mediocrity and
incompetence. The article focuses on the Jeffries case for four
reasons. First, it was precipitated by a public speech given
outside of the university setting, thus raising all three issues of
tenure, academic freedom, and free speech. Second, it has
prompted significant public debate and outcry. Third, far from
being an aberration, his speech reflected views that have per-
meated his professional career. Finally, there is abundant and
relatively detailed information available in the public press con-
cerning the facts and events of the case.33 This article contends
that the Jeffries incident not only undercuts the critics of ten-
ure, but vindicates the system if and when properly adminis-
30. See DEREK BoK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
THE MODERN UNIVERSITY 20-26 (1982); ASHLEY ELLEFSON, THE HIGHER SCHOOLING
IN THE UNITED STATES 118-21 (1978); PAUL F. LAZARSFELD & WAGNER THEILENS,
JR., THE ACADEMIC MIND: SOCIAL SCIENTISTS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 35-72 (1958);
CHARLES H. MCCORMICK, THIS NEST OF VIPERS: McCARTHYISM AND HIGHER EDU-
CATION IN THE MUNDEL AFFAIR, 1951-52, at 87-102 (1989); Robert M. O'Neal, Ten-
ure Under Attack, in BARDWELL L. SMITH ET AL., THE TENURE DEBATE 178-99
(1973).
31. See BYSE & JOUGHIN, supra note 28, at 138-39. See also Thomas I. Emer-
son & David Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as Citizen, in ACA-
DEMIC FREEDOM: THE SCHOLAR'S PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY 95, 97-100 (Hans W.
Baade ed., 1964); Fritz Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic
Freedom, in ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE 186-89 (Louis Joughin ed., 1967);
General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom and Academic Tenure
(1915), reprinted in 53 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 393, 403-405 (Summer 1990).
32. See Richard P. Chait & Andrew T. Ford, Tenure in Context, in ASHE
READER ON FACULTY AND FACULTY ISSUES IN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 171-79
(Martin J. Finkelstein ed., 2d ed. 1987). About 20 states introduced legislation to
limit, change, or end tenure during the 1960s and 1970s. In only one state did any
such legislation survive. Id. at 177-78.
33. According to the author's count from the New York Times Index, the
Times printed 38 stories on the Jeffries case in 1991, THE NEW YORK TIMES INDEX,
246, 594 (Harvey L. Holmes, Jr. ed., 1991), and eight stories in 1992. THE NEW
YORK TIMES INDEX, 251, 635 (Alan R. Greengrass ed., 1992). See, e.g., James Bar-
ron, Professor Steps Off A Plane Into a Furor Over His Words, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15,
1991, at B4; Gray, supra note 23, at B4; Verhovek, supra note 26, at B1; Samuel





tered. The second part of this Article proposes a typology for
thinking about varieties of speech on the college campus, based
in part, on elements of the Jeffries case.34
II. The Jeffries Incident
A. Background
On July 20, 1991, City College professor and Afro-American
Studies Department Chair, Leonard Jeffries, delivered a speech
at the state-sponsored Empire State Black Arts and Cultural
Festival in Albany, New York.35 The speech outlined "a con-
spiracy, planned and plotted and programmed out of
Hollywood," by "people called Greenberg and Weissberg and
Trigliani."36 Jeffries stated that Russian Jews "and their finan-
cial partners, the Mafia, put together a financial system of de-
struction of black people."37 He called Assistant Secretary of
Education Diane Ravitch "the ultimate, supreme, sophisticated,
debonair racist" and a "Texas Jew."38 Jeffries's comments were
not anomalous, but rather, were part of his broader view of race
relations which include his theory that the abundance of skin
pigment melanin in blacks confers greater intellectual and
physical advantages to them, than to those who have less pig-
ment-i.e., whites. Jeffries has also argued that whites, whom
he labels "ice people," are greedy, domineering, and materialis-
tic, whereas people of African descent, whom he labels "sun peo-
ple," are more communal and humanistic. 39
34. See infra part III.
35. The author will not deal with the questions of whether Jeffries was acting
in a professional capacity, as a private citizen, or whether his comments can be
considered inside or outside of his field of expertise. Compare David M. Rabban,
Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1405, 1409
(1988) ("Denying protection to acts by professors that fall outside the proper
bounds of their professional functions vindicates, rather than violates, academic
freedom.") with Ernest van den Haag, Academic Freedom in the United States, in
AcADEMIc FREEDOM: THE SCHOLAR'S PLACE IN MODERN SOCIETY 85, 87 (Hans W.
Baade ed., 1964) (suggesting that "academic freedom should protect a professor
even when he comments on matters outside his special field, and regardless of
context"). See also Weiss, supra note 24, at 8.
36. A Professor Flaunts his Bias, supra note 26, at A26.
37. Jacques Steinberg, CUNY Professor Criticizes Jews, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6,
1991, at B3.
38. Id.




Jeffries's videotaped speech attracted wide attention and
condemnation. Jeffries had expressed similar views in his
classes and in public in the past, however, they had never
before received such wide exposure.4° Educators, journalists,
and a variety of public figures called for CUNY to sanction Jef-
fries.41 State Assemblyman G. Oliver Koppell circulated a letter
within the state legislature urging Jeffries's dismissal.42 Gover-
nor Mario Cuomo stated, "it seems to me that the comments are
so egregious that the City University ought to take action or
explain why it doesn't."43 New York Senators Alfonse
D'Amato44 and Daniel Patrick Moynihan 45 called for Jeffries's
resignation as chair. The New York Times editorialized that of-
ficials at CUNY "[were] right to consider removing him as head
of the department."46
On September 19, 1991, the City College Faculty Senate
passed a resolution condemning Jeffries's remarks and views.47
The resolution, however, also opposed any punishment, based
on the protections provided by the principles of academic free-
dom and free speech. 48 On October 28, in what was considered
a rebuke to Jeffries, the Trustees of the City University voted to
extend his term as chair for eight months, instead of the stan-
dard three years.49 On October 29, the CUNY University
Faculty Senate passed a resolution condemning all race-based
attacks and hate speech, but did not mention Jeffries by name. 50
The following March, City College President Bernard Harleston
recommended that the trustees appoint Edmund Gordon, a re-
40. Four months before the Albany speech, the Times reported on some of Jef-
fries's views. Id.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 42-46.
42. Stanley, supra note 26, at B4.
43. See Verhovek, supra note 26, at B1.
44. James Traub, The Hearts and Minds of City College, NEW YORKER, June 7,
1993, at 42, 50.
45. Eric Pooley, Doctor J., N.Y. MAG., Sept. 2, 1991, at 33, 37.
46. A Professor Flaunts His Bias, supra note 26, at A26. See also A.M. Rosen-
thal, This Ugly Echo, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1991, at A17.
47. Alan Finder, Faculty Senate Assails Jeffries but Resists Censure, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1991, at B3.
48. Id.
49. Joseph Berger, College Chief Calls Jeffries 'Racist,' but Defends Keeping
Him, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1991, at B1.
50. Mervyn Rothstein, CUNY Vote on Jeffries Pleases Few, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.




tired Yale faculty member, as Afro-American Studies Depart-
ment chair.51 The board approved the nomination, effective
July 1, 1992.52 A month before Gordon was to assume the posi-
tion, Jeffries sued to retain the position of chair, alleging that
he would be deprived of his property for merely exercising his
First Amendment rights. 53 Agreeing that the college punished
Jeffries because of his Albany speech, a jury in federal district
court awarded him $400,000 in punitive damages in 1993.54
Following the verdict, Jeffries moved for a permanent injunc-
tion restoring his position as chair. The judge granted Jeffries's
motion and upheld the jury's verdict, but reduced the punitive
damage award by $40,000.55 On April 18, 1994, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the dis-
trict court ruling, but dismissed the jury's award for punitive
damages. 56
B. The Tenure Issue
Initially, critics noted that Jeffries's tenure protected him
from immediate dismissal. The New York Times reported that
"tenure ... should protect him against dismissal from his pro-
fessorship." 57 Both CUNY officials and non-university critics
noted that the principle of academic freedom, along with First
Amendment rights, should not be trampled because of the offen-
sive and factually suspect nature of Jeffries's comments.
58
These officials and critics believe that a faculty member whose
competence and judgment were suspect, is nevertheless pro-
tected by thick academic walls. On the other hand, Assembly-
man Koppell opined, "I don't think that tenure entitles someone
to be a preacher of hate."5 9 Critics question whether a system
51. Susan Chira, CUNY Ousts Chief of Black Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
1992, at Al.
52. Id.
53. Jeffries v. Harleston, 828 F. Supp. 1066, 1077-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1098 (President Harleston's payment to Jeffries was reduced from
$30,000 to $15,000, and that of CUNY Chancellor W. Ann Reynolds was reduced
from $50,000 to $25,000).
56. Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1250 (2d Cir. 1994).
57. A Professor Flaunts His Bias, supra note 26, at A26. See also Mickey
Kaus, Speech Defect, NEw REPUBLIC, June 14, 1993, at 6, 49.





that protects incompetence is worth retaining given the high-
sounding values espoused by institutions of higher learning.60
As mentioned earlier, tenure is not an absolute protection.
From its beginnings, the system was designed to incorporate
provisions for dismissal based on grounds including incompe-
tence, personal misconduct, and neglect of duty.61 Admittedly,
such dismissals are rare. According to the AAUP, approxi-
mately thirty-five to fifty tenured faculty are discharged each
year.62 Yet these numbers probably underestimate the number
of faculty forced out through informal agreement because of
their failure to live up to their responsibilities. 63 Anecdotal in-
formation suggests that the numbers are actually much
higher.64 However, they are not reflected in AAUP statistics be-
cause administrators may strike bargains with faculty to avoid
formal proceedings. One such example is an early retirement
package in exchange for a faculty member's agreement to leave
voluntarily.65
In any case, tenure does provide substantial security for the
simple reason that a faculty member's status changes signifi-
cantly at the time of the tenure decision. During a new faculty
member's period of probation (usually five to seven years66), the
60. See Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at E4; Maria Newman, Free-Speech Lesson,
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1993, at 33 (stating that universities have a concern for civil-
ity, tolerance, diversity, and teaching higher values).
61. BYSE & JOUGHIN, supra note 28, at vii-viii.
62. Rosenbaum, supra note 3, at E4.
63. Examples of faculty failing to fulfill their responsibilities would include
failure to meet with scheduled classes, refusing to meet with students for advise-
ment or assistance outside of class, unwillingness to maintain appropriate sub-
stantive content of classes the professor is required to teach, and physical or
mental incapacity. See PSCcuNY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF
CONGRESs/CUNY AND THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, Sept. 1, 1987-Aug. 31,
1990, at 47. According to a representative of the AAUP, faculty members can be
dismissed, regardless of tenure, for "gross neglect of duty, immorality or profes-
sional incompetence." Weiss, supra note 24, at 8.
64. At SUNY Cortland, for example, the author is familiar with four such
cases in the last decade, and no instances where the administration actually fol-
lowed through with the termination of a tenured faculty member based on ques-
tions of competence. In a highly publicized case in 1993, a senior faculty member
in the Cortland history department was convicted of making hundreds of harass-
ing phone calls to college administrators. In the end, he was allowed to retire (in
part so he could retain his retirement package) rather than be terminated.
65. See supra note 64.
66. See, e.g., STATE UNIV. OF N.Y., POLICIES OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 1993
12 (1993) (providing that under section 3(b) of Title B of Article XI, an assistant
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faculty member bears the primary responsibility of demonstrat-
ing to the institution why she or he should continue to be em-
ployed. To this end, the untenured faculty member typically
amasses a substantial personnel file which details achieve-
ments, objectives, skills, and generally demonstrates that the
faculty member is meeting the institution's expectations. 67
Once tenure is granted, however, the burden of proof shifts from
the faculty member to the institution. Promotion aside, the
faculty member must no longer make the case for continued em-
ployment, since it is now assured. Instead, the burden shifts to
the institution to demonstrate why the individual is no longer
meeting the institution's requirements. 68
Another benefit of the probationary period is its use as a
developmental or therapeutic process. However, this use is
often ignored or undervalued both in literature and in practice.
For example, a comprehensive analysis of the tenure and pro-
motion process in higher education ignored this process. This
analysis summarized ten characteristics of an effective system
of tenure69 and promotion as follows: 1) a promotion and tenure
process that reflect the institution's nature; 2) a promotion and
tenure system consistent with the institution's objectives and
goals; 3) a system that balances professional priorities with the
institution's academic priorities; 4) a system incorporating the
expectations of both departments and the institution; 5) institu-
tional policies that are clearly written and understood; 6) con-
sistent and fair application of policies; 7) a system that is
manageable; 8) existence of a viable grievance process; 9) a sys-
tem that is within the law; and 10) a system that is considered
generally credible.7o Absent from this list, however, is any men-
tion or consideration of the probationary period within the ten-
professor is eligible for continuing appointment after completion of a total of seven
years in a position of academic rank).
67. See ALLAN TuCKER, CHAIRING THE ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT 143-69 (1981).
68. The primary alternative to tenure is the contract system. See, e.g., Com-
mission on Academic Tenure in Higher Educ., supra note 1, at 10; Penina M.
Glazer, The Concept of Tenure and an Alternative, in WALTER P. METZGER ET AL.,
TENURE 15 (1979).
69. An effective system of tenure is understood here to mean one which incor-
porates a meaningful assessment of the accomplishments of the faculty member,
consistent with the goals and objectives of the institution, and that offers possible
remedies for those faculty members seeking to improve their performance.




ure process as a developmental or therapeutic process for the
faculty member.71 An effective system of tenure should incorpo-
rate more than a summary approval or disapproval of the
faculty member's level of work. It should also analyze the ways
in which the faculty member can meet the institution's expecta-
tions to improve performance regarding teaching, research, and
service. Additionally, an effective system should include appro-
priate prescriptions. Such a system leaves the faculty member
with little doubt about what the institution expects.
A sample framework for a system of therapeutic advice and
counseling could include the following elements: an evaluation
of teaching methods with suggestions for improvement; specific
suggestions regarding the subject matter of scholarly activities;
and particular suggestions for appropriate college service activi-
ties. While such specific prescriptions might be considered
overly paternalistic at some institutions or in some academic
departments, it is an approach that is most likely to cultivate
faculty who will best fit the needs of the institution, while re-
taining strong affirmative loyalties. This approach will better
serve the institution's interests, keeping in mind two factors: 1)
that most faculty who seek tenure receive it, and 2) institutions
are more likely to retain faculty who will continue to be positive
and constructive contributors.
Jeffries was hired to chair the Afro-American Studies De-
partment in 1972. However, the hire included tenure based on
the recommendation of the search committee.7 2 Those who par-
ticipated in the hiring later disputed their justification for in-
cluding tenure in the offer.73 The reasons cited for hiring
Jeffries with tenure included: Jeffries's high standing among
"cultural nationalists," a part of the Black Power movement
that extolled all things African; Jeffries's pre-existing consider-
able contacts in his field of study; and the threat by black
71. Other works contain similar gaps. See, e.g., MORRILL & SPEES, supra note
16, at 269-85; NATIONAL EDUC. ASS'N, ENTERING THE PROFESSION: ADVICE FOR THE
UNTENUIRED (1988).
72. John Tierney, For Jeffries, A Penchant For Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
1991, at B10.




faculty and students to precipitate conflict if Jeffries was not
extended such an offer.74
Jeffries did not undergo the customary probationary period.
Although rare, faculty members hired with tenure typically
have substantial academic experience at another institution.75
Since Jeffries was hired with tenure, he was unable to benefit
from the developmental and evaluative components of the ten-
ure process.
C. Alternate Opportunities for Evaluation
While the Jeffries case emphasized the tenure issue, evalu-
ation may also take place through the promotion processes and,
on many campuses, through a system of merit pay adjust-
ments. 76 While tenured faculty members are not required to
seek promotion or merit pay increases, most do so. Thus, the
evaluative process previously described for tenure may also ap-
ply to promotion and salary adjustments, which provide added
evaluative opportunities for faculty with tenure. Jeffries was
hired in 1972 as a full professor, which is extremely unusual
since he had just recently completed his dissertation and had
very little experience.7 7 According to Robert E. Marshak, City
College president at the time of Jeffries's hire, the offer of ten-
ure and full professorship was unusual but justified because of
the recent development of the field and the dearth of candi-
dates.78 Marshak further stated that, "[w]hen you're trying to
build up new disciplines .. .you generally make more conces-
sions in terms of tenure and rank than you would in older disci-
74. Id. Jeffries taught as an instructor in City College's Political Science De-
partment in 1969, and then helped found the Black Studies Department at San
Jose State University. Pooley, supra note 45, at 36. Jeffries completed his doctoral
dissertation from Columbia University on subnational politics in the Ivory Coast
in 1971. Id.
75. The policy for the State University of New York (SUNY) is that tenure for
associate professors and professors shall normally be granted only after three con-
secutive years of service at the institution granting tenure, and seven years of ser-
vice for assistant professors, although campus presidents and the SUNY
chancellor retain discretion to grant tenure under other circumstances. See STATE
UNIV. OF N.Y., POLICIES OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 1993, at 12 (1993).
76. For example, the nation's largest university system, the State University
of New York, has a system of merit pay. Merit pay decisions are considered a
typical responsibility of a department chair. See TUCKER, supra note 67, at 129-30.
77. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.




plines. It was difficult to attract talented candidates in new
areas, and he was considered a very talented person."79 These
justifications notwithstanding, Jeffries bypassed both the ten-
ure review process and the promotions review process.
D. Evaluation Criteria
With some variations, the faculty assessments that accom-
pany personnel evaluations are built on the academic triad of
teaching, scholarship, and service. 0 Larger research-oriented
universities with substantial graduate schools are more likely
to emphasize scholarly and research activities, while smaller in-
stitutions are more likely to emphasize teaching as the most im-
portant criterion since they focus on undergraduate education.81
Generally speaking, service is less important than research and
teaching.82 All three, however, are normally considered in per-
sonnel evaluations, despite their relative importance.83
City College is predominantly an undergraduate institution
with approximately 14,000 students, 11,500 of whom are under-
graduates. 84 The agreement between CUNY and its faculty
union, the Professional Staff Congress, provides that faculty are
evaluated on their teaching-related activities, scholarly and re-
search-related activities, and various service commitments, but
"with especial attention to teaching effectiveness."85
79. Id.
80. KENNETH E. EBLE & THE CONFERENCE ON CAREER DEVELOPMENT, CAREER
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EFFECTIVE COLLEGE TEACHER 85 (1971); MILLER, supra note
5, at 56.
81. See BURTON R. CLARK, THE ACADEMIC LIFE: SMALL WORLDS, DIFFERENT
WORLDS 85-86 (1987).
82. See, e.g., Aux ROBINSON, ACADEMIC ADVANCEMENT AT SUNY 3-5 (1992).
83. Id.
84. Joseph Berger, Turmoil and Tradition At City College, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1991, at E6; Traub, supra note 44, at 43.
85. PSCcuNY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF CONGRESS/
CUNY AND THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, Sept. 1, 1987-Aug. 31, 1990, at 36-
37. The three basic categories of teaching, scholarship, and service are broken
down into nine specific categories in the contract, including: "1. Classroom instruc-
tion and related activities; 2. Administrative assignments; 3. Research; 4. Schol-
arly writing; 5. Departmental, college and university assignments; 6. Student
guidance; 7. Course and curricula development; 8. Creative works in individual's





The extensive coverage of the Jeffries case in the press
highlighted key elements of Jeffries's record. Since joining the
City College faculty in 1972, Jeffries's record of scholarship has
been labeled "astonishingly meager."8 6 By his own account, Jef-
fries's scholarly works consist of a fifty-page unpublished book-
let prepared for junior-high-school-level students,87 a chapter in
the state Education Department's 1989 report "A Curriculum of
Inclusion,"8 a 1976 article in the magazine supplement of the
newspaper the Amsterdam News,8 9 and a book on South Africa
published in 1983 for the World Council of Churches, for which
he claims editorship. 90
In a personnel review process following conventional aca-
demic standards, none of these writings would be considered ac-
ceptable scholarly publications, with the possible exception of
the book on South Africa.91 While scholarly activity is some-
times criticized for its obscurity and narrow standards, the pub-
lication process is important because it submits one's written
work to peers and editors for review and peer reaction. This
process is vital because it advances academic discourse in a field
of study, subjects the work to others in the field of study for
critical evaluation, and as a result of revisions based on reader
critiques improves the level of the published work. Publications
in the "popular" press or other non-academic venues are not
necessarily precluded from legitimate consideration; however,
works in these venues must be subject to evaluation for their
intellectual rigor and contribution to academic and public dis-
course. In other words, the mere existence of writing is not suf-
ficient as a basis for accepting the legitimacy of research and
86. Traub, supra note 44, at 48.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 47.
89. Tierney, supra note 72, at B28.
90. Traub, supra note 44, at 48.
91. According to one analysis in the field of political science of the relative
weight accorded edited books in the tenure and review process, Clive S. Thomas
and Ronald J. Hrebenar note, "In most political science departments edited books
rank just above newspaper articles and non-refereed journal publications and cer-
tainly well below textbooks. Some departments don't count edited books as publi-
cations." Clive S. Thomas & Ronald J. Hrebenar, Editing Multiauthor Books in
Political Science: Plotting Your Way Through an Academic Minefield, 26 PS: POL.




inquiry. Writing must be subject to broader scrutiny and verifi-
cation to insure that work is accurate, substantiated, or other-
wise meets meaningful standards associated with the
advancement of knowledge. Even unpublished papers
presented at professional conferences advance this objective,
since the work is exposed to a wider audience of interested pro-
fessionals. Therefore, Jeffries's written work is not consistent
with the underlying standards of the academic profession.
2. Teaching
At least one report has stated that Professor Jeffries is pop-
ular among students in his classes, and is considered "a charis-
matic figure, with an almost cult-like following at City
College."92 However, serious questions have been raised regard-
ing his commitment to teaching and the level of substance of his
classes.
A reporter who observed four of his classes noted that, of
the four, Jeff-ies came late twice (15 minutes and 25 minutes),93
and failed to show at all in two other instances.9 4 Students re-
port that this pattern is typical for his classes. 95 If this is so, it
represents a serious lapse in teaching responsibilities. Stu-
dents also report that plagiarizing each others' papers without
penalty is commonplace in Jeffries's class.96 In addition, dis-
senters or others who disagree with Jeffries's views in class
prompt ad hominem responses designed to suppress their
views.97 Other faculty members reported that students taking
the Jeffries-guided curriculum are ill-prepared academically
and intellectually. 9 Reportedly, Jeffries's classes are highly po-
lemical, and substantively weak.99 Jeffries's theories, pro-
pounded both in public and in the classroom, find little or no
support in disciplines such as history, biology, or Afro-American
92. Traub, supra note 44, at 43.
93. Id. at 44.
94. Id. (stating that on these days, in these classes, an assistant taught the
class).
95. Id. at 49.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 49, 52.
99. Id. at 44, 49, 52; Massimo Calabresi, Dispatches, TIME, Feb. 14, 1993, at




Studies. 00 His theories include his view that Jews bear the pri-
mary responsibility for past African American enslavement, 10
and that skin pigmentation is related to intelligence and
behavior. 0 2
The second-hand accounts in this article are no substitute
for direct observation and assessment of documents including,
but not limited to, course syllabi, testing instruments, and
course-teacher evaluations. 0 3 However, even these second-
hand accounts raise substantial questions about Jeffries's
teaching effectiveness.
3. Service
A key reason for Professor Jeffries's hire in 1972 was
CUNY's establishment and cultivation of a new academic de-
partment. Therefore, service activity should carry greater
weight in any overall assessment. 04
Even in the area of service, substantial competency ques-
tions have been raised. Specifically, allegations have been lev-
eled against Jeffries's conduct as department chair. It has been
alleged that Jeffries's anti-Semitic remarks have poisoned his
relations with other faculty and administrators at City Col-
lege;10 5 that his substance and style could have caused his de-
partment to become stigmatized and isolated in the college' ° as
reflected in "three 'disruptive' incidents" in which Jeffries was
100. Harold Brackman, Jews Had Negligible Role in the Slave Trade, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 1994, at 16; Weiss, supra note 24, at 8. Princeton's then-director of
Afro-American Studies, Cornel West, said "We certainly can't understand the mod-
ern world in terms of climate and pigmentation." Tierney, supra note 72, at B28.
101. Pooley, supra note 45, at 33.
102. Id. at 34.
103. These are standard methods for evaluating teaching; no comment is be-
ing offered here regarding the methods of evaluation actually employed at City
College with regard to Jeffries's teaching.
104. In an informal interview conducted by this author in November of 1993
with a former faculty member from City College, I was told that Jeffiies's argu-
ment was indeed that he was hired to build a department, that he was essentially
a public educator whose audience properly extended beyond the boundaries of the
college, and that the traditional personnel evaluation process is racist. Except for
the last accusation, the other factors would not mitigate the standard approach to
faculty evaluation.





involved; 1°0 that his statements have harmed City College's rep-
utation; 08 and that the college's ability to raise money from
alumni has been damaged. 09 In addition, Jeffries has been ac-
cused of other indiscretions, such as, threatening the life of a
student reporter for the Harvard Crimson during a 1991 inter-
view,"10 the harassing questioning of a leading candidate for di-
rector of the college's International Studies program during a
1985 interview,"' and other similar incidents. 112 If true, any of
these incidents would provide prima facie evidence of an inabil-
ity to carry out the responsibilities of a department chair.113
These public accounts suggest the existence of evidence to
question Professor Jeffries's competence in all three areas of the
academic triad. 14 Jeffries's tenure poses no obstacle to the ini-
tiation of proceedings against his continued status as a faculty
member at City College, or to his continued service as depart-
ment chair. However, the question remains, why have two
courts ruled against the college's attempt to remove him as
chair?
E. The Failure of Will
The federal district court noted in its decision that City Col-
lege officials have been aware of the problems surrounding Jef-
fries for many years, yet have failed to take any action against
107. Id. at 1081. See also id. at 1097 n.50 (describing another incident).
108. Joseph Berger, CUNY Board Votes to Keep Jeffries in Post, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1991, at B1-B4 [hereinafter Berger, CUNY Board]; Rosenthal, supra note
46, at A17.
109. Maria Newman, CUNY Says Speech by Jeff ries Hurt Fund Raising, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1994, at B3.
110. Rothstein, supra note 50, at B4.
111. Berger, supra note 49, at B6.
112. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1075-76.
113. The responsibilities of a department chair vary from institution to insti-
tution, but department chairs are, by definition, administrators who represent the
institution of which they are a part. Actions they take which harm the reputation
of the department or institution, or which erode relationships with other col-
leagues or departments, are inimical to the administrative function. See generally
TUCKER, supra note 67.
114. The academic triad is teaching, scholarship and service. See supra text
accompanying note 80. See Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1097 (noting in its decision
that "there appears to have been some indication. . . of rather serious improprie-





him, either as a faculty member or as chair. 115 President Harle-
ston "has known for years about Dr. Jeffries' statements, has
conducted three reviews and has never moved beyond a state-
ment of criticism.""16 Only after Jeffries's 1991 Albany speech
did City College officials attempt to remove Jeffries from the po-
sition of chair." 7 Therefore, when a jury was presented with
the question of whether the college was punishing Jeffries for
exercising his free speech rights, rather than for his conduct as
chair, it sided with Jeffries. In its verdict, the federal district
court was unequivocal:
the action taken by the University was constitutionally impermis-
sible. This is and must be the case, in spite of the hateful, poison-
ous and reprehensible statements made by the professor in the
speech in question. This need not have been the case if the Uni-
versity had offered convincing, firsthand proof at trial that either
the consequences of the speech disrupted the campus, classes, ad-
ministration, find-raising or faculty relations, or that the profes-
sor had turned his classroom into a forum for bizarre, shallow,
racist and incompetent pseudo-thinking and pseudo-teaching."l 8
The court went on to discuss the congratulatory tone of the
many documents in which the university approved Jeffries's
reappointments as chair." 9  Moreover, CUNY officials
"presented not one scintilla of credible evidence that the dra-
matic shift in President Harleston's attitude toward the plain-
tiff and the accompanying sense of urgency within the
administration ... was caused by anything other than plain-
tiff's July 20, 1991 speech." 20 The court also clearly asserted
that it did not seek to unduly limit the discretion of the admin-
istration in making such personnel decisions. 12' "Defendants
and City University bear the responsibility for and the freedom
of making employment decisions with respect to Department
115. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1075, 1097.
116. Berger, CUNY Board, supra note 108, at B4. Harleston had worked qui-
etly to try and ease Jeffries out. Id.
117. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1079-80.
118. Id. at 1071.
119. Id. at 1079-80.
120. Id. at 1080.




Chairpersons. However, they may not base their decisions on
unconstitutional grounds."122
F. Assessment
City College completely mishandled the Jeffries incident. 23
This mishandling did not begin with the Albany speech, but
rather, dated back to his initial appointment in 1972.124 De-
spite considerable evidence that Professor Jeffries had improp-
erly performed his duties as a college professor, 125 CUNY failed
to make a proper, evidence-based case to justify Jeffries's re-
moval from his chairmanship. 126 In addition, City College
robbed Jeffries of the opportunity to submit his performance to
personnel reviews in both the tenure and promotion processes.
This was a particularly grievous lapse given Jeffries's very lim-
ited academic experience at the time of his appointment.
Although the tenure system was blamed in part for the situa-
tion that arose in 1991, it should not have been, because tenure
was not properly implemented in Jeffries's case. The college's
instant conferral of full professorship upon Jeffries obviated
similar opportunities for evaluation.127
The frustrations expressed by CTNY officials, political
leaders, and others concerned with the consequences of Jef-
fries's inflammatory and non-substantive rhetoric are entirely
understandable. Although an academic in name and title, the
available evidence supports the conclusion that Jeffries's behav-
ior in the classroom, on campus, and off campus is entirely in-
consistent with the norms and values that underlie institutions
of higher learning.128 His case is not problematic because he is
controversial, because he speaks on race issues, or because he is
122. Id. at 1095. This logic applies even if one considers Jeffries's speech as a
part of his professional obligations carried out in his capacity as an appointed con-
sultant for the New York State Education Department. Id. at 1073.
123. Jeffries, 828 F. Supp. at 1072.
124. Id. at 1075.
125. See supra parts II.D.1-3.
126. The New York Times noted that "the Jeffries case will serve as a lesson to
other universities on how not to discipline an employee." Newman, supra note 60,
at 33.
127. This point went largely ignored in the public debate over the Jeffries
case. But see Leonard Kriegel, A Tale of Two Leonards, 1 RECONSTRUCTION 143,
No. 4 (1992) (noting an exception to this gap).




flamboyant (although these factors explain the wide public at-
tention the case has garnered). Rather, his case is problematic
because he makes unsupported claims involving race relations,
a subject to which society is singularly sensitive. After all, if
Jeffries or anyone else had, for example, produced real, scientifi-
cally verifiable evidence that the presence of melanin has the
effects he claims, this case would not have unfolded as it did.
Although Jeffries's speech was the event that riveted public
attention, it is not the important substantive issue addressed in
this article. Yet his speech does raise important questions of
the limits of academic freedom, the relationship between that
freedom and academic responsibilities and standards, and the
relationship between academic freedom and First Amendment
free speech protections. Each of these topics alone warrants de-
tailed treatment. 129
The balance of this article will address the question of how
to think about the kind of speech symbolized by the Jeffries
speech, in a campus setting.
III. A Typology of Campus Speech
Considerable attention has been focused in recent years on
campus speech. 130 In particular, controversies surrounding is-
sues like hate speech and the so-called "political correctness"
debate present campus administrators, faculty, and students
with the difficult problem of trying to decide how, or whether,
any form of speech regulationon campus is appropriate.13' The
129. See, e.g., Symposium, Academic Freedom: The Scholar's Place in Modern
Society, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429 (Summer 1963); Symposium on Academic
Freedom, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1247 (June 1988); Freedom and Tenure in the Academy:
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the 1940 Statement of Principles, 53 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3 (Summer 1990).
130. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (addressing the constitution-
ality of regulating speech on public university campuses).
131. See Campus Culture Wars: Five Stories About PC (PBS television broad-
cast, Sept. 25, 1993) (quoting Alan Dershowitz contending that, "[iut's not like in
the 1950s, nobody's going to jail, nobody's losing tenured positions, but there is a
very significant threat to freedom of speech, particularly among young, untenured
assistant professors. And even among tenured professors."). On the same pro-
gram, a senior history department faculty member from the University of Wiscon-
sin said that he used his name to shield younger faculty from reprisal in offering
public comment on such campus controversies. Id. Whether imagined or real, it is




United States Supreme Court has given clear indication that it
views "hate speech" codes with suspicion. 132
The language that composed Jeffries's Albany talk, as well
as his classroom and other campus speech, provides one exam-
ple of the type of speech that has concerned many on American
college campuses. A recent, comparable example arose on the
campus of Kean College, where a senior official of the Nation of
Islam gave a speech criticized as "cruelly abusive" to Catholics,
Jews, whites, gays, and even some black leaders. 133
This article does not offer a solution to the speech regula-
tion problem, but rather, proposes a framework for analyzing
campus speech.13 4 The proposal is predicated on the principle
that campus speech, like free speech itself, holds a "preferred
position" among individual rights.135 It should be subject to the
least intrusive form of regulation, because of the preeminence of
speech as a core democratic value, 36 as well as its vital impor-
tance to the academic mission of the university. This typology
is also predicated on the assumption that the university faces a
third option, aside from imposing sanctions ("thou shalt nots")
threats to academic freedom. This current controversy alone provides evidence
that tenure continues to be as important to academic freedom as it ever was.
132. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). The Court ruled unani-
mously against a city ordinance that criminalized speech likely to provoke "anger
or alarm" based on "race, color, creed, religion, or gender." Id. at 2540. Five mem-
bers of the Court argued that the law should be struck down because it was "con-
tent-based"-i.e., it sought to regulate language dealing with certain specific
subjects. Id. at 2541-50. The other four members argued that the law in question
was overly broad, thus posing a threat to other forms of legitimate speech. Id. at
2558-60. See also J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Realist Ap-
proaches to the First Amendment, 3 DUKE L.J. 375 (1990); Charles R. Lawrence III,
If He Hollers.Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 3 DUKE L.J. 431
(1990); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Propo-
sal, 3 DUKE L.J. 484 (1990); Kathryn M. Dessayer & Arthur J. Burke, Leaving
them Speechless: A Critique of Speech Restrictions on Campus, 14 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 565 (1991).
133. Jon Nordheimer, Angry Echoes of Campus Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26,
1994, at B4. The speech was given by Khalid Abdul Muhammad on November 29,
1993. Id.
134. This framework arises from the author's participation in a series of four
two-day seminars held on the campus of SUNY Oneonta in the Spring and Fall of
1992 on hate-speech and the college campus, funded by a grant from the Gannett
Foundation.
135. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).
136. 3 Preferred Freedoms, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
1439 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds., 1986).
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on hateful utterances or doing nothing. The third option, con-
sistent with the educational mission of universities, is the es-
tablishment of codes or guidelines that emphasize the positive,
constructive behaviors institutions wish to cultivate ("thou
shalts"). As Rodney Smolla 3 7 argues, "the battle against hate
speech will be fought most effectively through persuasive and
creative educational leadership rather than through punish-
ment and coercion." 138 Such statements of principle include ex-
pectations that the campus should foster high standards of
civility, respect for diversity, and the like. 3 9 One might argue
that such affirmative statements carry little weight in campus
behavior. Yet a positive, educational approach is highly appro-
priate in the university setting.
A. Campus Speech Matrix
What follows is a scheme designed to divide realms of cam-
pus speech into categories in order to better define and under-
stand the complexities of campus speech. 140 The scheme is
depicted in Table 1, and encompasses the varieties of speech
found on the college campus. It is based on what might be
termed a "locational analysis"-that is, the scheme is organized
around the location and context, rather than the content, of the
speech.
137. Rodney Smola, professor of constitutional law at the College of William
and Mary School of Law, has authored many books about the freedom of speech.
See, e.g., RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (1992); RODNEY A.
SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL v. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL (1988);
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION (1986); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE
PRESS (1986).
138. Rodney Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a Uni-
versity, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 224 (Summer 1990).
139. Models for such wording can be found in publications of the American
Association of State Colleges and Universities-in particular, their publications
COMMITTEE ON EDUC. EQUALITY, AMERICAN ASS'N OF STATE COLLEGES AND UNIV.,
RACISM AND CAMPUS DIVERSITY (1989); COMMITTEE ON PURPOSES, POLICIES AND PRI-
ORITIES OF THE AM. ASS'N OF COLLEGES AND UNIVS., ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND
"POLITICAL CORRECTNESS," (1991); DAVID S. TATEL ET AL., HOW THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT APPLIES TO OFFENSIVE EXPRESSION ON THE CAMPUSES OF PUBLIC COLLEGES
AND UNIVERSITIES (1990).
140. Smolla, supra note 138, at 218 (suggesting that the "soundest view is to
treat the campus not as one unified forum, but as subdivided into multiple forums
to which differing free speech standards apply"). Smolla applies this analysis to









Nature of Speech Classroom Areas Areas
Planned (1) (2) (3)
Impromptu (4) (5) (6)
Symbolic Behavior as Expression (7) (8) (9)
1. Nature of Speech
These nine cells depict the spectrum of where and what
type of speech arises on a college campus. A complete analysis
requires studying both the nature and the context of the speech
in these nine scenarios. "Nature of speech" itself incorporates
three varieties of utterances: planned speech, impromptu
speech, and symbolic behavior as expression. Each variety has
unique characteristics that raise different issues making it sub-
ject to separate analysis and varying degrees of regulation.
Planned speech poses a relatively small problem because
planned activities of a controversial or potentially offensive na-
ture can be organized in such a way as to allow for the structur-
ing of dissent in appropriate and functional ways. To take the
previously mentioned incident at Kean College, the outside
speaker was invited to speak on the campus by a student group,
was paid an honorarium, and gave his address at a pre-set loca-
tion and time. While the content of his speech was inflam-
matory, it was certainly within the ambit of campus guidelines.
Had other students wished to protest the speech, they could
have done so as long as they did not disrupt the speech itself.
Impromptu speech, which is unpredictable and spontane-
ous, poses a more difficult problem. Aside from the realm of the
classroom, which is regulated by the faculty member (and with
the understanding that students may follow established griev-
ance avenues in instances of faculty misbehavior), other areas
on campus may be realms where campus rules of behavior are
the only means of regulating and controlling impromptu speech.
However, it is difficult to imagine an example of impromptu
speech where existing campus harassment codes would not pro-




tion to campus sanctions, offensive impromptu speech may be
deterred by emphasizing sensitivity to such issues as an impor-
tant part of the training of resident assistants, dorm directors,
student leaders, and others involved in student life. Freshman
orientation, dormitory meetings, and counseling sessions pro-
vide opportunities to transmit such values.
Symbolic behavior poses perhaps the most difficult problem
of the three categories of campus speech. At least since the
1960s, the campus setting has been one where a wide range of
symbolic behavior has been given free rein. In addition, the
general thrust of cultural norms in recent years, as well as the
verdicts from several Supreme Court cases,14' all suggest the
avoidance of restrictions in this area. Even when some espe-
cially odious and offensive symbols, such as the swastika and
the confederate flag, appear on a person or inside a dorm room,
the campus should avoid regulatory attempts. However, gen-
eral campus rules that restrict or bar the hanging of items
outside of windows, for example, would certainly incorporate
such symbols. (The presence of such symbols within the class-
room should certainly be allowed as long as they serve some ed-
ucational purpose.)
2. Context of Speech
There are three categories of places where speech might oc-
cur: the classroom, the residential area and the common area.
The degree of regulation varies according to the location of the
speech. Since the teaching profession is largely self-regulating,
the classroom is clearly the area most directly under the control
of the faculty member. The discretion of the faculty member
over the conduct of the class is, and should be, great. 142 Even
141. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (finding the burning of an
American flag to be expressive conduct and thus, protected by the First Amend-
ment); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (overturning a criminal conviction for
flag misuse because the statute was unconstitutionally vague as to what consti-
tuted a violation); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (overturning a convic-
tion for flag burning because the defendant had been wrongfully punished for his
words which accompanied the action); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (upholding the right of public school children to wear armbands in pro-
test of the Vietnam War); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (reversing a
conviction for displaying a red flag based on the statute's vagueness and
indefiniteness).




so, faculty may abuse their authority in the classroom. Stan-
dard university guidelines govern how, and under what circum-
stances students may challenge a faculty member's classroom
conduct of speech-related activities. 143
Residential areas are the living spaces of students and
some staff, and thus warrant treatment commensurate with
that fact. The close quarters of the dorm setting in which stu-
dents normally live, require regulations that may infringe on
aspects of speech in order to maintain some degree of order.
Common areas represent the most open and public forums
on a campus. Codes pertaining to these areas might reasonably
parallel those of public parks and village greens.
Cass Sunstein's analysis of campus hate speech provides
support for this locational analysis. 44 Sunstein supports re-
strictions by campuses on speech "to the extent that the restric-
tions are closely related to its education mission." 45
Interestingly, all of the examples Sunstein cites to support such
regulations involve instances occurring in classrooms (aside
from his discussion of faculty personnel evaluations) even
though Sunstein's argument revolves around content-based reg-
ulation. 46 Yet it is equally clear that many of his examples of
permitted regulation are limited only to the classroom. Exam-
ples include, rules supporting the maintenance of civility in the
class, and restrictions on classroom speech based on the ger-
maneness of the speech to the subject of the class. Neither of
these examples would be appropriate or allowable as regula-
tions on campus outside of the classroom. Sunstein's argument
143. Id. at 222.
144. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 197-
208 (1993). Cass Sunstein is a member of the faculty of the University of Chicago
School of Law, and the author of numerous articles and books on constitutional
issues. See, e.g., CASs R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTRUCTION (1993); CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEING THE REGULATORY STATE
(1992). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992).
145. Smolla, supra note 138, at 201.
146. CAsS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 204-
07 (1993) (discussing the Jefries case). Sunstein argued that his removal is justi-
fied either in response to a poor professional record or if the university could show
that "the relevant speech makes it very difficult or impossible for the employee
adequately to perform his job"-a position to which Sunstein seems sympathetic.





that speech regulations are allowable in the classroom specifies
a particular location on campus where the rule would apply.147
It is just as clear that classroom civility standards would be
inappropriately strict for a college dorm room or a campus quad.
Thus, location becomes a crucial variable in determining the ex-
tent and nature of regulation.
B. Description of Matrix Cells
The nine cells in Table 1 represent nine distinct speech-re-
lated issues. Each is specified below:
(1) lectures, planned discussions, class-related exercises
and activities related to curriculum;
(2) meetings, rap sessions in dorm lounges, meeting rooms,
etc. Dorm presentations planned and hosted by student groups,
student life personnel, faculty, and other invited guests;
(3) lectures, panel discussions, organized meetings, en-
tertainment and artistic events;
(4) unplanned outbursts by students or faculty in ways not
structured into the curriculum, broadly defined, or intrusion by
others not normally included in the particular classroom who
intrude in an unplanned and appropriate or inappropriate way;
(5) the normal discussion and social intercourse to be found
in any living area;
(6) the normal discussion and social intercourse found in
any common area;
(7)-(9) clothing, armbands, posters, flags, decals, pins,
other non-verbal forms of expression (the modes of expression
are the same here regardless of the location or context; how-
ever, this does not mean that the regulatory remedy would be
the same in each).
C. Discussion of Matrix Cells
Each of the nine cells poses a distinctive situation for
speech on campus. Too often, discussions and analyses of
speech-related problems on campus fail to make key distinc-
tions between campus locations, and types of speech. Yet mean-




ingful analysis must incorporate such consideration because the
regulatory consequences are somewhat different for each.
(1) Planned-classroom areas should be most free from reg-
ulation. Offensive comments from students in planned discus-
sions should be dealt with by instructors as part of the learning
experience; offensive comments by faculty as part of the curricu-
lum may raise question of faculty competence to be addressed
through the personnel process by department chair, dean, etc.
(e.g., a lecture which accepts as fact the proposition that the
Holocaust is a myth).
(2), (3) Planned-residential/planned-common areas re-
served for common or public use should be accessible to all
members of the campus community (and those invited from the
outside by members of the campus community) when facility
use follows usual campus channels. Such areas may be subject
to time-place-manner restrictions, if necessary to sustain public
order.
(4) Impromptu-classroom involves situations where disrup-
tive or abusive outbursts are generally considered to be incon-
sistent with the core academic values of the university setting,
and may be subject to harassment proceedings or other discipli-
nary actions.
(5), (6) Impromptu-residential/impromptu-common areas
involve circumstances where threats, harassment, verbal
abuse, intimidation and the like suggest forms of harassment to
be dealt with through the campus judicial system.
(7) Symbolic behavior as expression in the classroom incor-
porating, for example, wearing of arm bands, clothing or items
on clothing designed to make a political or other statement
would normally be allowed unless the presence of such items
resulted in short-circuiting the learning environment, in the
judgment of the instructor. The same principle would apply to
signs, posters, etc.
(8) Symbolic behavior as expression in residential areas is
an environment where students should be generally free to en-
gage in such expression when in the confines of their rooms.
Disputes between roommates may require campus adjudica-
tion. Such expression outside of the room (on the outside of a
door, outside of a window, in common areas) may be limited by




be displayed (e.g. limiting materials to designated bulletin
boards). Students who post offensive materials on the outside
of their dorm room doors (under circumstances where college
codes allow such a practice) may be the object of informal coun-
seling or floor discussion if the posted material prompts com-
plaints from other students.
(9) Symbolic behavior as expression in common areas is
normally allowed, and not subject to regulation (aside from pub-
lic nudity or overtly harassing behavior).
D. Assessment
This scheme is offered as a work in progress, and as a
means for shedding more light on speech in the campus envi-
ronment. It emphasizes: 1) the importance of thinking about
the campus as a multifarious environment where its citizens
live, work, and play and 2) the desirability of relying on posi-
tive, constructive values to resolve speech-based conflict. Uni-
versities must lean toward free expression; yet they must not
neglect the values of civil discourse and respect for others.
IV. Conclusion
An institution of higher learning should (to borrow reck-
lessly from Abraham Lincoln) be of the faculty, by the adminis-
tration, and for the students. It may indeed be true that
"academic freedom has caused power and influence to migrate
from the central administration to the faculty."148 The same ef-
fect might be attributed to tenure. But the weight of academic
freedom and tenure are counterbalanced in the university set-
ting by peer review and the ultimate authority of administra-
tors to exercise personnel decisions over faculty, whether
tenured or not.
In the Jeffries case, City College administrators denied
both Professor Jeffries and themselves a key avenue for culti-
vating a young and inexperienced faculty member by awarding
tenure and a full professorship at the point of Jeffries's initial
hire. Subsequent to that decision, the administration failed to
pursue considerable evidence that Jeffries was not performing
his job satisfactorily. Even if such charges proved to be un-




founded, the failure of the college to seriously question or inves-
tigate the allegations until after the July 1991 speech
represents a second serious failure to use existing powers and
mechanisms to assure the academic integrity and reputation of
its institution. Tenure undeniably provides a measure of secur-
ity for faculty; yet nothing in the Jeffries case suggests fault in
the tenure structure. Indeed, there is every reason to believe
that the tenure and promotion structure, properly applied,
would have either led to general improvement in Jeffries's per-
formance, or impelled him to seek employment elsewhere.
The anger and frustration expressed by many inside and
outside of the academic community is understandable, espe-
cially in the light of Jeffries's court victory. But it is important
to remember that the tenure system is hardly infallible, and
that "attempts to make it easier to get rid of incompetents make
it easier also to dismiss competent professors."149 Furthermore,
while bad cases may make bad law, the same does not apply to
bad or unsavory people. 50 The particulars of controversial
cases cannot and should not be divorced from the broader prin-
ciples that frame them. As the former.chair of the City College
Faculty Senate, Bernard Sohmer (himself a target of Jeffries's
invective) noted, "I think Leonard Jeffries is a terrible person
... a seriously flawed, anti-Semitic person. On the other hand,
the structure of the university is more important than Leonard
Jeffries."'15
149. Van den Haag, supra note 35, at 87.
150. The Supreme Court has made good law from bad situations in several
cases. For example, in Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), sleaze merchant
Larry Flynt won reversal of a judgment against him for his cruel parody of Jerry
Falwell. In the process, Flynt helped carve out new First Amendment protections
for satire. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) the court held that even
the controversial ideas of the Ku Klux Klan may receive constitutional protection.
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court held that even a career
criminal and rapist had a constitutional right to counsel during police questioning.
Finally, in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) the Supreme Court expanded
the protection of the First Amendment in a case involving a xenophobic, racist,
bigoted scoundrel.
151. Rothstein, supra note 50, at B1, B4.
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